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Introduction
Negotiation is often the preferred method of the international community for resolving political conflicts between insurgent groups and governments. However, governments may be reluctant to fully engage in negotiations, as doing so could be perceived as granting legitimacy to the political claims of insurgents and weakening the government’s standing in the eyes of its citizens, the international community, and its adversaries. Nevertheless, when it becomes evident that guerrilla fighters cannot be easily subdued, that their actions threaten the government’s stability, or that the prolonged conflict could drag the nation into an extended civil war—leading to further territorial instability and weakening state power—the government, whether willingly or not, is eventually compelled to extend its hand for negotiations.
Governments often prefer to negotiate with insurgent groups that have a cohesive leadership structure, as this increases the likelihood of effective negotiations and successful implementation of settlements. However, in some cases, governments may choose to engage with fragmented or splintering factions, leveraging their internal divisions to weaken the overall movement. Despite such tactical maneuvers, for a negotiation to yield a lasting resolution, it is advisable for the government to engage with groups that have broad representation, significant influence over their constituency, and a well-structured leadership hierarchy.
Why Does the Prospect of Negotiation Spark Controversy in Amhara Politics ?
The mere suggestion of negotiations, whether real or perceived, frequently incites strong opposition within Amhara political discourse. This skepticism is not unfounded, as past negotiations undertaken by Abiy Ahmed’s government with various rebel groups have failed to address fundamental political grievances. Instead, they have largely served to maintain the status quo. Consequently, many fear that if negotiations with Amhara-affiliated groups follow the same trajectory, the core issues affecting the Amhara people will remain unresolved, rendering their sacrifices futile.
The mere suggestion of negotiations, whether real or perceived, frequently incites strong opposition within Amhara political discourse. This skepticism is not unfounded, as past negotiations undertaken by Abiy Ahmed’s government with various rebel groups have failed to address fundamental political grievances. Instead, they have largely served to maintain the status quo.
Another major concern is the perceived unreliability of Abiy Ahmed’s administration. Many believe that the government’s primary motivation for negotiating is to enhance its international image as a proponent of peace rather than to genuinely acknowledge and address Amhara political grievances. Furthermore, the current power imbalance between the government and Fanno groups exacerbates fears that negotiations would place the latter at a severe disadvantage. At present, Fanno lacks a unified and cohesive command structure, possesses weaker military capabilities, and has limited territorial control. These factors diminish its bargaining power, allowing the government to dictate the terms of any potential agreement and potentially use negotiations as a means to dismantle the movement altogether.
Additionally, there is a lack of clear representation within the Fanno movement. No single faction has been universally recognized as the legitimate representative of Amhara interests, raising concerns about whether any negotiating body can authentically advocate for the broader Amhara cause. Given these factors, it is unsurprising that discussions of negotiation provoke deep skepticism within the Amhara political landscape.
Additionally, there is a lack of clear representation within the Fanno movement. No single faction has been universally recognized as the legitimate representative of Amhara interests, raising concerns about whether any negotiating body can authentically advocate for the broader Amhara cause. Given these factors, it is unsurprising that discussions of negotiation provoke deep skepticism within the Amhara political landscape.
Preconditions for Effective Negotiation from the Fanno Perspective
For any political entity to engage in negotiations with the government effectively, it must possess a level of bargaining power commensurate with its demands. Entering negotiations without sufficient leverage risks yielding concessions that serve only to reinforce the government’s position. Therefore, before contemplating negotiations, the Fanno movement must prioritize strengthening its bargaining power through unity, military capability, territorial control, and international recognition.
- Internal Unity and Leadership: The movement must establish a unified, legitimate, representative, and inclusive leadership structure. While it may not initially encompass every faction, it should represent a majority of the groups involved. Over time, as credibility is established, additional factions may align with the central leadership.
- Military Strength: To enhance its bargaining power, Fanno leadership must expand its military presence in key Amhara regions (such as Gojjam, Gonder, Wollo, and Shewa). This includes increasing the number of trained personnel, strengthening the chain of
command, and acquiring adequate weaponry. The leadership must also demonstrate effective control over its forces, ensuring discipline and the ability to enforce commands. - Territorial Control: Establishing and maintaining areas free from government military and bureaucratic authority would signal strength. While providing public services in these territories may be challenging due to resource constraints, demonstrating control over governance structures would serve as evidence of administrative capability.
- Popular Support: The movement must consolidate support from the Amhara population, the diaspora, and influential media outlets. A broad-based political movement with grassroots support would bolster Fanno’s legitimacy as a negotiating entity.
- International Recognition: Gaining sympathy and recognition from international actors, including the U.S., EU, UK, AU, and UN, is crucial. The international community must at least be willing to listen to Fanno’s grievances and encourage the Ethiopian government to engage in meaningful negotiations.
Who Has the Authority to Negotiate on Behalf of the Amhara People or the Fanno Movement ?
At present, no single entity possesses the necessary combination of representation, military strength, territorial control, popular support, and international recognition to negotiate on behalf of the Amhara Fanno movement. Any faction that claims to hold such authority would likely find itself in a weak negotiating position, ultimately susceptible to government exploitation—similar to what occurred in past negotiations with factions of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and groups in the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz regions.
At present, no single entity possesses the necessary combination of representation, military strength, territorial control, popular support, and international recognition to negotiate on behalf of the Amhara Fanno movement.
Can Amhara’s Grievances Be Addressed Through Negotiation ?
The answer to this question is both yes and no. If negotiations merely replicate past agreements—where the status quo is maintained, minor political privileges are granted to factional leaders, and Fanno forces are disarmed and disband without accountability for war crimes, genocides, and human rights violations committed against Amharas—then negotiations will fail to address the fundamental grievances that sparked the conflict in the first place.
However, negotiations could provide a pathway to resolving Amhara political concerns if they are approached differently from past precedents. A successful negotiation must address the root causes of Amhara grievances, which have persisted for over half a century. If the negotiation process leads to transitional justice mechanisms and the establishment of a transitional government that facilitates constitutional and administrative reforms, then it could indeed serve as a viable solution.
Two Potential Solutions to the Amhara Question
I personally believe that there are two primary paths to addressing Amhara grievances and resolving Ethiopia’s broader ethnic political dilemma:
1. A New Political and Constitutional Framework Beyond Ethnic Politics: Ethiopia should establish a new constitutional order based on universal democratic principles such as equality, justice, and political mobilization centered on ideology rather than ethnicity or religion. While a federal form of administration could still be maintained to optimize governance and service delivery, it should not be structured along rigid ethnic lines. All ethnic groups should have the right to preserve their languages, cultures, and histories, with constitutional protections ensuring the rights of minority communities.
2. Reform Within the Ethnic Federal System: If some ethnic political elites insist on preserving the current ethnic federal system, it must be reformed to address Amhara concerns. This includes legally resolving claims over territories such as Metekel, Wolkite, Raya, Dera, and Addis Ababa. Amharas living outside the Amhara region should be granted official minority status with legal protections ensuring their cultural, economic, and political rights. Regional constitutions should be revised to guarantee sovereign rights for all residents rather than favoring dominant ethnic groups. Laws and institutions that disenfranchise minorities must be abolished. All state constitutions should be amended to ensure sovereign authority for all residents of a given region, rather than selectively granting it to the majority ethnic group. For instance, the Oromia regional constitution grants sovereignty exclusively to the Oromo people while relegating others to a secondary status. Similarly, the Benishangul-Gumuz regional constitution explicitly declares that only the Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao, and Komo are the rightful owners of the region, effectively marginalizing other ethnic groups.
Beyond constitutional amendments, laws and political institutions that strip minorities of their rights or grant them fewer rights than the majority must be abrogated. Any legislation that provides special privileges to the majority—whether in access to government services, eligibility for political office, or participation in economic activities—should be rendered void. For example, Oromia region has a law that reserves a majority of city council seats for Oromos, even in cities where Oromos do not constitute the majority of residents. Such discriminatory policies, which resemble apartheid, must be abolished. Additionally, electoral reforms—such as replacing first-past-the-post voting with proportional representation—should be implemented to ensure fair political representation.
In conclusion, while negotiations could provide a pathway to resolving the Amhara question, they must be approached with caution to ensure they genuinely address long-standing grievances rather than serving as a tool for political expediency. Without significant structural reforms and an equitable balance of power at the negotiating table, any agreement risks perpetuating the very injustices that ignited the conflict in the first place. Most importantly, before entering into negotiations, strengthening Fanno’s bargaining power must take precedence. Any discussions or negotiations conducted before the establishment of a formidable force with strong leverage are doomed to fail.
Editor’s Note: The views expressed in articles published by East African Review are those of the individual authors, institutions and do not necessarily reflect the perspectives of the editorial team or East African Review as an organization. The publication of any Op-Ed piece does not imply endorsement by East African Review.—please feel free to share them in the comments section below or email us at [email protected].
